Because there was a Stalinist era it is an exaggeration to say that the Russian Duma election in 2016 was the worst election ever in Russia, but it is no exaggeration to say the 2016 election had the most extensive and largest magnitudes of frauds since the 2000 presidential election. Many diagnostics can support that claim, but here we show only a few results in support using methods in the Election Forensics Toolkit (Hicken and Mebane 2015; , including the finite mixture likelihood model (Mebane 2016) . We also use results from a method developed by Rozenas (forthcoming).
In the September 2016 legislative (Duma) election Russians cast two ballots, one for a party competing for seats determined nationally by proportional representation (PR) and one for a candidate running for a single-member district (SMD) seat. A similar mixed voting system had previously been used between 1993 and 2003. The State Duma consists of 450 deputies elected for five-year terms. In 2016 half of the deputies were elected by PR with 5% threshold and another half in plurality SMDs. The 2011 Duma elections were marred by allegations of fraud (Enikolopov, Korovkin, Petrova, Sonin and Zakharov 2013) and massive protests, but in 2016 authorities referred to the importance of genuine popular support and clean elections. Since 2011 the electoral system was modified, the parliamentary threshold was reduced from 7% to 5%, and independent candidates were allowed to participate. Appointment of a new head of the Ella Pamfilova having a reputation as a human rights advocate was aimed to build greater trust and credibility in the upcoming elections (Roth 2016 ).
The legal framework remains complex restricting candidate registration, formation of party blocks, campaigning, and electoral observation (OSCE 2016) . New laws such as anti-protest law, imposing heavy fines on organizers or participants of unsanctioned demonstrations and anti-NGO laws, 1 serve as additional checks on the civil society (Gregory 2016) .
In 2016 the Kremlin enacted a "voter demobilization" campaign aimed to discourage critically-minded voters from participation by shifting elections to the fall when many
Russians are on vacation, harvesting crops or students are back to school. Many discouraged voters chose to ignore or to boycott the election (Rezunkov 2016) . The
Kremlin used administrative resources-the regional political machines-to mobilize its own supporters and to provide overwhelming victory to the party of power.
Putin's high approval ratings suggests that no special measures would have been needed, but over the electoral campaign preelection polls reported a sharp decline in the United Russia party's ratings: from 40% in early 2016 to 31% by the end of August according to Russia's leading independent polling agency Levada Center (Sharkov 2016). Unfavorable election polls for the party of power provoked a sharp reaction from Kremlin. Two weeks before the election the justice ministry labeled Levada Center a "foreign agent", making its future uncertain and sending a strong signal to other Russian pollsters (Vladimirov 2016).
New legal limitations on domestic observers reduced election observation. For instance at most two observers were allowed per party/candidate, all observers were assigned to a specific precinct, and observers under the guise of media representatives (one of the solutions used in the past to involve non-partisan observers-non-partisan citizen observation doesn't exist in Russia) were no longer allowed (Law 2016 Similar to the previous Russian elections, in 2016 the regional governors were responsible for mobilizing their regional "political machines" to provide a favorable electoral result and to signal their loyalty status to Kremlin (Kalinin 2016a ). Governors were interested in boosting the level of turnout to provide their respective regions with more mandates in the lower chamber and they were incentivized to boost the United Russia's support to meet the Kremlin's demand (Mebane and Kalinin 2010 ). Consequently we expect ballot stuffing and protocol tampering. Election anomalies in turnout and in United Russia's vote shares serve as a basic "signaling" mechanism by which the governor reports loyalty to the Center (Kalinin 2016b; Kalinin and Mebane 2011) .
Such signaling is apparent in Table 1 , which for elections from 2000 through 2016
reports mean statistics for variables that indicate whether the last digit of the rounded percentage of a count is zero or five (Hicken and Mebane 2015) . Table 1 3 In every election shown in Table 2 the party in focus in the analysis is the party that received the most votes nationally. For Figure 5 the candidate in focus in each district is the candidate with the most votes in the district.
4 f i and f e are respectively the probabilities that each precinct is affected by incremental or extreme frauds. Smaller values of α mean that larger fractions of votes are shifted from opposition to the leading candidate. A higher value of θ implies that incremental fraud garners a higher number of votes for the leading party. τ and ν are respectively the mean turnout proportion and mean proportion of votes for the leading party in the absence of fraud. Table 2 also includes reports of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that there are no frauds (i.e., that f i = f e = 0), along with the number of polling station observations for each election. affecting votes. If α < 1 then vote stealing is more important, and if α > 1 manufacturing votes from nonvoters is more important (Mebane 2016, 8-9) .α suggests that vote manufacturing is the dominant fraud mechanism in every election since 2000. Estimates of the number of votes produced by incremental and extreme frauds (Mebane 2016, 13) show nearly two million fraudulent votes in the 2016 PR vote, amounting to 3.6%
of the recorded votes (Table 3) Table 3 about here ***
To convey information about the geographic dispersion of frauds in the 2016 PR votes, Figure 7 shows hotspots and Figure 8 shows local spatial clustering patterns of conditional frauds probabilitiesf ii andf ei (Mebane 2016, 12-13) . See Hicken and Mebane (2015, 13-14) and Mebane (2015, 8-12) for hotspot/clustering methods explanations and for color legends. 6 Hotspots and clusters are estimated using estimates of the probability that that each precinct i = 1, . . . , n is a case of no fraud (f 0i ), incremental fraud (f ii ) or extreme fraud (f ei ) (Mebane 2016, 12) .
We apply the Getis-Ord G i analysis of hotspots (Ord and Getis 1995) to measure whether the mean off ii andf ei values geographically close to observation i differs from the global mean. It seems that in both cases of extreme and incremental fraud high values (red dots) are almost uniformly scattered across the Russian territory suggesting that anomalies are clustered in many small localities across Russia (in the case of incremental frauds two big clusters of anomalies draw our attention, these clusters are located in Altaiskii krai, Republic Marii El and Amurskaya oblast'). Note: LR is the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that there are no frauds (i.e., that f i = f e = 0). n is the number of polling station observations. Note: polling station fraud probability hotspot analysis using Getis-Ord G i (Mebane 2015, 8-12) . Red colors show areas where local average scores are significantly above the overall average. Blue colors show areas where local average scores are significantly below the overall average. Gray indicates polling station locations that do not differ significantly from average. Significance levels refer to tests adjusted for the false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995) . Note: polling station fraud probability hotspot analysis using local Moran's I i (Mebane 2015, 8-12) . Red, high value among high values; blue, low value among low values; green, low value among high values; orange, high value among low values. Gray indicates polling station locations that do not differ significantly from average. Significance levels refer to tests adjusted for the false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995) . 
